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Abstract 
 
The question of whether high immigration produces anti-immigration hostility has vexed 
researchers across multiple disciplines for decades. And yet, understanding this relationship is 
crucial for countries dependant on immigrant labour but concerned about its impact on social 
cohesion. Absent from most of this research are theories about the impact of early-years 
socialisation conditions on contemporary attitudes. Using the British sample of the European 
Social Survey (2002-2017) and two innovative approaches to modelling generational 
differences – generalised additive models (GAMs) and hierarchical age‒period‒cohort 
(HAPC) models – this paper shows that rather than producing hostility to immigration, being 
socialised in a context of high immigrant-origin diversity is likely to result in more positive 
attitudes to immigration later in life. This implies that through generational replacement, 
countries like the UK are likely to become increasingly tolerant of immigration over time. 
Importantly, however, a context of high-income inequality may diminish this effect. 
 
Keywords: Immigration, political socialisation, public opinion, cohort analysis, United 
Kingdom. 
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The large-scale movement of people across borders is one of the defining political issues of the 
twenty-first century. Immigration is dividing western societies (McLaren 2012), disrupting 
established party systems (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Golder 2016; Pardos-Prado 2015), and 
producing surprise referendum outcomes like the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. 
We face momentous questions about the future prospects for western democracies, most of 
which appear to be reliant on migrant labour for vital services and the smooth functioning of 
their economies: Will anti-immigration hostility continue to rise if migration continues to 
increase? Will this result in further increases in support for anti-immigration parties and 
leaders? Will the issue of immigration continue to divide western democracies for the 
foreseeable future, or is it possible that this issue will eventually no longer be of great concern?  
 Evidence-based answers to these questions are largely elusive, as evidence on the 
relationship between immigrant numbers and public attitudes to immigration is extremely 
mixed. On the one hand, as would be argued by classic ethnic threat approaches, increasing 
numbers of migrants have been shown to be associated with more negative attitudes to 
immigration (McLaren 2003; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Schneider 2008; Semyonov 
et al. 2008). On the other hand, as might be predicted by intergroup contact theory, increasing 
numbers have also been shown to produce more positive attitudes to immigration (Hewstone 
and Schmid 2014; Wagner et al. 2006; Weber 2019) or to have no impact due to the likelihood 
of threat and contact cancelling one another out (Evans and Need 2002; Sides and Citrin 2007; 
Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Questions about the impact of ethnic diversity on social cohesion 
have similarly divided social capital research (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).  
Despite the fact that scholarly work has emphasised the importance of socialisation 
experiences for subsequent attitudes, values and behaviours (Krosnick and Alwin 1989; 
Neundorf et al. 2013; Sears and Valentino 1997), the vast majority of research on the 
immigration numbers-attitudes relationship tends to focus on relatively contemporary levels of 
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(or relatively short-term changes in) diversity (see Coenders and Scheepers 1998 for a rare 
exception; see also, Weber 2019). Much of this existing research has overlooked a crucial 
factor in understanding how attitudes to immigration are formed—and change—within a 
population through generational replacement. Replacement of older generations with younger 
ones implies that trends in immigration attitudes would change substantially if, for example, 
older generations hold systematically different attitudes to immigration than younger 
generations. The scarcity of research on this topic is not a minor omission, as understanding 
generational differences in attitudes to immigration is likely to provide insight into the 
contradictory findings that have puzzled this body of research for more than two decades. It 
also has significant effects on our ability to provide answers to the sorts of policy-oriented 
questions raised above. 
Until recently, data and modelling limitations made investigating the impact of early-
years macro-level socialisation experiences extremely difficult. Drawing on advances in 
modelling cohort effects, this paper uses two state-of-the-art approaches – generalised additive 
models (GAMs) and hierarchical age‒period‒cohort (HAPC) models – to investigate whether 
attitudes to immigration are persistently different across birth cohorts. We also investigate 
whether any potential cohort differences are related to different macro-level diversity 
conditions experienced by each generation. Our model is investigated using the British sample 
of the European Social Survey, rounds 1-8, conducted between 2002-2017. This dataset allows 
us to follow groups of birth cohorts that were socialised from 1935 to 2010. We match these 
individual-level data with early-years macro-level diversity using census data, and with other 
early-years contextual data – in particular, economic data – as well as contemporary contextual 
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data, to analyse the impact of all of these on current attitudes to immigration.1 The 
incorporation of economic data allows us to examine whether any impact of diversity as a 
socialisation effect could be moderated by economic conditions, as emphasised by ethnic threat 
theories (e.g., Golder 2003; Quillian 1995). In addition to the economic conditions normally 
incorporated in the ethnic threat literature (unemployment and GDP), our analysis examines 
the effect of an important economic condition argued by social capital research to produce 
particularly divisive conditions—economic inequality (Uslaner 2002). 
The findings suggest that even controlling for potentially confounding factors such as 
aging, changing education levels, and diversity and economic conditions at the time of each 
wave of the survey, younger generations are increasingly more positive about immigration, and 
these generational differences are related to the level of diversity in the UK in a cohort’s early 
(impressionable) years. Robustness tests show that these findings are unlikely to simply be a 
result of a more general increased tolerance among younger cohorts. The findings also reveal 
that one particular economic condition in the early years – level of income inequality – may 
moderate the positive impact of diversity: high levels of income inequality appear to reduce 
the positive effect of macro-diversity.  
This paper makes several contributions. First, the paper draws attention to generational 
differences in immigration sentiments and attempts to establish empirically (and 
systematically) whether generations differ in their views towards immigrants, thus adding to a 
small but growing body of research on this topic (Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Ford 2011; 
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018; McLaren and Paterson 2019; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 
2011). Much of this existing research is unable to incorporate early-years diversity into its 
 
1 Comparative data on diversity from the early post-World War II period are not available, and so we limit our 
analysis to the case of the UK, where we are able to find the data necessary to investigate the impact of diversity 
on multiple birth cohorts over the last 80 years. 
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analyses, however, and so the paper’s second contribution is to shift the analysis of the impact 
of macro-level diversity from contemporary to past diversity, to show how a context of 
relatively high diversity in the country during an individual’s formative years may ultimately 
produce more positive immigration attitudes later in life (though this may be dependant on 
inequality conditions, as noted above). Finally, focusing on the drivers of generational 
differences provides us with insights into potential future trends in attitudes to immigration.2 
Our findings thus have significant implications for understanding anti-immigration sentiment, 
as well as issues connected to it such as social cohesion. 
Generational Differences in Attitudes to Immigration 
Central to this paper’s argument is the idea that birth cohorts are likely to vary in their attitudes 
to immigration. Birth cohorts are groups of individuals who have shared experiences due to 
prevailing conditions at the time they were socialised (Neundorf and Niemi 2014). There are 
several reasons to expect differences in attitudes to immigration across birth cohorts. First, 
research on the development of individual-level political attitudes and behaviours has long 
emphasised the impressionable or formative years – the time between childhood and adulthood 
– in influencing subsequent attitudes and behaviours.3 Young people (so the argument goes) 
are not yet set in their ways and are thus more easily influenced by external factors (Alwin and 
Krosnick 1991; Grasso et al. 2019; Jennings 1989; Sears and Valentino 1977). Particularly if 
cohorts have faced differing macro-level societal conditions during their early years, they may 
 
2 Specific forecasts would require data on (and expert understanding of) relevant factors such as mortality rates, 
which is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
3 For the sake of simplicity, we generally refer to these as ‘early years’ or ‘impressionable years’ throughout the 
paper. Key socialisation years are normally thought to be adolescence, at approximately 15-20 years old (see 
Bartels and Jackman 2014; Neundorf and Soroka 2018). In Online Appendix 11, we further test the sensitivity 
of this specification by varying the age of the formative years.  
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display dissimilar values, attitudes and behaviours. Inglehart’s contention that economic 
security during individuals’ formative years leads to long-lasting post-materialist values is 
perhaps the most seminal example of the impact of macro-level conditions on values later in 
life (Inglehart 1971, 1990; but see, for instance, Clarke and Dutt 1991); other research also 
confirms that early-years macro-level socialisation conditions impact values and attitudes later 
in life (Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2014; Neundorf and Soroka 2018).  
 A second reason that we might expect to find cohort differences in attitudes to 
immigration is that there is strong evidence of the existence of generational differences in 
values that are related to attitudes to immigration such as authoritarianism, with younger 
cohorts apparently becoming less authoritarian (Norris and Inglehart 2019). In addition, 
research on the relationship between age and attitudes to immigration points to the possibility 
of cohort differences: while some studies show very minimal effects of age (Crepaz and 
Damron 2008; Weldon 2006), many others find that older individuals consistently display less 
tolerance towards immigrants than younger individuals (Citrin et al. 1990; Coenders and 
Scheepers 1998, 2008; Ford 2011; Quillian 1995; Semyonov et al. 2006).  
The ability to draw inferences about generational differences in attitudes and 
behaviours has, however, largely been limited by cross-sectional research designs or an 
inability to account for all potentially confounding factors (e.g., age). Despite these limitations, 
some have concluded that the effects described above are not simply aging effects – i.e., 
individuals becoming more conservative, authoritarian, and/or intolerant as they grow older – 
but that generational, or cohort, differences are, in fact, likely (e.g., Ford 2011). The small body 
of research that systematically investigates this topic in the context of immigration attitudes 
(see Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Ford 2011; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018; Wilkes and 
Corrigall-Brown 2011) indicates that significant cohort differences are indeed likely – though 
7 
 
most of these studies have been limited by an inability to analyse the impact of early-years 
diversity on these differences. Our first hypothesis is, therefore:  
 
H1: Cohorts display distinct (significantly different) immigration attitudes, even when 
controlling for age effects and all other relevant factors. 
 
To our knowledge, providing an empirical test of this hypothesis presents the first 
documentation of generational differences in immigration attitudes in the British population.  
 
Early-Years Socialisation Conditions and Attitudes to Immigration 
Despite the potential importance of socialisation conditions for values and attitudes, scholarly 
studies of immigration attitudes in Europe tend to focus on relatively contemporaneous factors 
that influence contemporary attitudes, or at best, the impact of relatively short-term fluctuations 
of these (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2006). We do not contest the importance of short-term factors 
in explaining variation in attitudes to immigration – indeed, we control for these in our models 
below – but contend that macro-level socialisation conditions may be crucial and largely 
overlooked. That is, much of the existing research on the topic of diversity and attitudes to 
immigration fails to grapple with the possibility that contemporary attitudes to immigration are 
determined by macro-level circumstances that prevailed many years previously and that current 
conditions may matter far less than these early socialisation experiences. 
Within the body of research on generational differences in values and attitudes, 
including the small number of studies specifically on immigration attitudes, the focus has 
generally been on early-years macro-economic conditions.  However, it is potentially equally 
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– if not more – important that birth cohorts in European democracies have faced very different 
diversity-related conditions during their most impressionable years. In most of these countries, 
cohorts of individuals who were born in the 1930s, 1940s, and even 1950s would have been 
socialised at times of relatively low diversity, which then became much higher when these 
cohorts were already in their 50s, 60s, and 70s. For most of these cohorts, large-scale 
immigrant-origin diversity would have, therefore, been less prominent in their daily lives (e.g., 
people they meet in the streets, their friends, celebrities on television and in cinema, to name a 
few) during their impressionable years compared to cohorts born in the 1970s and beyond. The 
increased diversity by the time the younger birth cohorts were being socialised would have 
meant an increased likelihood of experience with immigrant-origin diversity being a daily part 
of life, either actually (e.g., via friends, schools, and co-workers) or virtually (e.g., via the 
media).   
Understanding the UK context 
In the case of the UK, for cohorts born in the early 1930s, only approximately three per cent of 
the UK population would have been foreign-born during key socialisation years (i.e., 
adolescence); by the time of socialisation for the early-1970s birth cohorts, this figure had more 
than doubled, and it continued to increase for subsequent cohorts (see Figure 1). Additionally, 
while early migrants to the UK lived predominantly in London and a few other major port 
cities, by the early 1970s, the geographical locations of immigrants and immigrant-origin 
minorities had broadened significantly (Holmes 1991: 217).  
Perhaps more important from a macro-diversity perspective was a ‘normalisation’ of 
visible immigrants and their descendants via increasing inclusion in British culture. Sport and 
the media are two pertinent examples. England’s 1966 World Cup winning squad was 
uniformly white, and England’s first black player, Viv Anderson, was not recruited until 1978. 
However, by the 1989-90 football season 11.5 per cent of all English Football League players 
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were black (McGuire 1991: 104; cited in Polley 1998: 149), England named their first black 
captain in 1993 (Paul Ince), and by 2002 nine out of England’s 23-man World Cup squad were 
black, with a similar figure (eight of 23) in 2010 (Polley 1998: 149).  
Figure 1: UK Foreign-born population 
 
Note: The figure shows the percent foreign born and 5-year change in percent foreign-born 
based on UK census results (Migration Watch 2014). 
 
Immigrant-origin individuals also became more visible via other parts of the media over 
this period. For instance, Trevor McDonald—born in Trinidad and Tobago to an Afro-
Caribbean mother and Indian father—emerged as a breakthrough non-white newsreader in 
1973. The presence of minorities on British television increased significantly after this, partly 
as a result of ‘multicultural’ policies at major news channels (e.g., Channel 4) explicitly 
designed for this purpose. By 2000, it was estimated that approximately 7.5 per cent of 
television appearances (with speaking roles) were by immigrant-origin minorities.4 By 2009 
 
4 Younge, Patrick (2000), ‘Blink and you'll miss these actors. Why? Because they're Asian’, The Guardian, 
02.10.2000, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2000/oct/02/channel4.broadcasting 
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10 per cent of the BBC TV population were BAME5, and by 2018 12.5 per cent of the TV 
population on BBC1 and BBC2 were from an ethnic minority6. 
Immigrant-origin diversity was, however, not readily embraced during the early years 
of rising macro-diversity. Incidents such as the 1958 Notting Hill riots, Peter Griffiths’ 
infamous racist campaign slogan in the 1964 Smethwick by-election, the formation of the 
National Front in 1966, and Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 1968 are oft-cited 
examples that exemplify how toxic the migration debate was in UK. Though the UK 
government began to try to restrict immigration in the 1960s, importantly, it also passed 
legislation (Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976) designed to improve ‘race relations’ 
and shift the focus of discourse onto improved treatment of immigrants and immigrant-origin 
minorities living in the UK (Holmes 1991; Layton-Henry 1992). This change in discourse may, 
in turn, have increasingly impacted younger generations’ perceptions of immigrant-origin 
minorities. 
In short, for most individuals growing up in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, immigrant-
origin minorities would have largely been absent from day-to-day life—in their direct 
experience and indirectly via media and sport. It is also likely that they would have been seen 
as a source of tension and division within the UK, given the events described above. On the 
other hand, for most individuals growing up in the 1980s and beyond (e.g., born in the 1960s 
or after), the presence of immigrant-origin minorities would have been a relatively common 
part of everyday life—again, either through personal contact or via media and sport. The 
discourse surrounding immigrant-origin diversity was also likely to be very different. This 
 
5 ‘Every one has a story: The BBC’s Diversity Strategy 2011-2015, The BBC, May 2011, 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/diversity/pdf/Diversity_strategy_110523.pdf 
6 ‘On-Screen Diversity Monitoring: BBC ONE and BBC TWO 2018’, Ofcom, October 2018,  
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changing context of macro-diversity in early socialisation years is, in turn, likely to be 
significant in understanding cohorts’ current attitudes to immigration.   
Expected effects of increasing immigration  
Based on the existing research on the contemporaneous relationship between diversity and 
attitudes to immigration, expectations about the impact of early-years diversity are, at first 
glance, not entirely clear, though. Seminal research on this topic points to the likelihood of 
diversity prompting a greater sense of threat, as a group’s resources are – whether in fact or 
merely perceived – placed under higher levels of strain. The result is more negative attitudes 
to the out-group in question (Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995). The one study that attempts to 
investigate the impact of early-years diversity (Coenders and Scheepers 1998) finds that this is 
indeed the case, at least in the Netherlands (though the effect is weak). One might, therefore, 
hypothesise that: 
 
H2a: Increased diversity during a birth cohort’s formative years leads to more negative 
immigration attitudes in later life. 
 
 On the other hand, several studies of contemporaneous relationships fail to find any 
association between immigrant population size and (contemporaneous) attitudes to immigrants 
(Evans and Need 2002; Rustenbach 2010; Sides and Citrin 2007; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). 
In keeping with the intergroup ‘contact hypothesis’, still others find that greater immigration-
related diversity produces more positive attitudes to immigration: in this case, 
contemporaneous diversity on average has an overall positive effect on attitudes, as the impact 
of (positive) contact with minorities ultimately outweighs the countervailing trend of threat 
(see Hewstone and Schmid 2014; Wagner et al. 2006; Weber 2019). Indeed, the rare studies 
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that are able to incorporate measures of contact and macro-level diversity conclude that contact 
does indeed help to reduce the sense of threat that might otherwise be created by 
contemporaneous diversity (Stein et al. 2000; McLaren 2003).  
Ford’s (2011) research alludes to the possibility that a similar effect may be occurring 
as a socialisation effect in the UK: younger cohorts have been socialised in a climate in which 
the presence of ‘Others’ – immigrants and immigrant-origin minorities – is commonplace when 
compared to previous cohorts.7 Thus, norms and expectations surrounding the composition of 
the national population are likely to have changed the way citizens view the issue of 
immigration. Moreover, the vast increase in diversity across the UK (on average) is likely to 
have provided far greater opportunity for contact (Stein et al. 2000; Sigelman and Welch 1993) 
– whether actual or virtual (via media and sport) – with immigrant-origin minorities during 
early-years socialisation, ultimately reducing the sense of anti-immigration threat for these 
cohorts. An alternative hypothesis to H2a is, therefore:  
 
H2b: Increased diversity during a cohort’s formative years leads to more positive attitudes to 
immigration in later life. 
 
 Given the emphasis on macro-economic conditions found in existing literature on 
socialisation and in research on attitudes to immigration, we incorporate multiple macro-
economic indicators into our analysis below. Research on the effect of contemporaneous 
macro-level conditions on immigration attitudes highlights the potential threat created by 
 
7 We consider Ford’s prior analysis to only be suggestive of cohort socialisation effects because his analysis does 
not attempt to address the significant age-period-cohort (APC) modelling problems discussed below, nor does it 
include an indicator of macro-diversity as a socialisation effect.  
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difficult macro-economic conditions (Semyonov et al. 2006). Some have further suggested that 
difficult economic conditions interact with high levels of diversity to produce a particularly 
competitive environment in which anti-immigration sentiment develops (Golder 2003; Quillian 
1995). We incorporate these ideas as period effects, as well as socialisation effects. Our third 
hypothesis is, therefore: 
 
H3: Poor macro-economic conditions combined with high levels of diversity during a cohort’s 
formative years produce more negative immigration attitudes in later life. 
 
Data 
Our analyses are based on the British sample of eight rounds of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), conducted biennially between 2002-2017, in particular, the 13,661 respondents who 
themselves as well as their parents were born in the UK.8 Our data and analyses are organised 
at the country level, rather than, for instance, a lower geographical unit, for several reasons. 
First, on theoretical grounds, the national rather than sub-national level is the appropriate level 
of analysis as we are arguing that on average across the UK, physical and virtual contact, as 
well as expectations regarding what ‘normal’ levels of diversity should be, are likely to have 
changed drastically. Second, our analyses require knowledge of where a respondent grew up 
during their formative years rather than where a respondent currently lives; this is unknown. 
 
8 First and second immigrants (determined by a series of questions in the ESS about citizenship status) are omitted 
from the analysis, resulting in a loss of 18% of observations. Though these individuals are an important part of 
the story of how attitudes to immigration may be changing over time (i.e., compositional changes to cohorts), 
our concern here is with whether there is likely to be attitude change resulting from cohort change amongst the 
so-called native population (defined here as those who do not self-identify as a first or second generation 
immigrant). 
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Finally, the simultaneous estimation of age, period and cohort effects requires enough 
observations to distinguish between these effects; further subdividing cohorts and periods into 
regions would not leave us enough data to estimate our effects.  
Measuring Immigration Attitudes 
Immigration attitudes are measured using three items that appear in all rounds of the ESS: 
• Would you say it is generally bad or good for the UK’s economy that people come to live 
here from other countries? Bad for the economy (0), Good for the economy (10).  
• Would you say that the UK’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people 
coming to live here from other countries? Cultural life undermined (0), Cultural life 
enriched (10).  
• Is the UK made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other 
countries? Worse place (0), Better place (10). 
These items were combined into a single index, with values ranging from 0 to 10, from 
more negative attitudes to immigration to more positive attitudes to immigration.9  
 
 
 
9 Inter-item correlations (Pearson’s r) were all greater than 0.60 and the items load onto a single factor in a 
Principal Components analysis. The scale reliability coefficient – Cronbach’s alpha – is 0.886, indicating a very 
high internal consistency of these three items. We further investigated our models on each item separately and 
the findings are very similar to those presented here. The results are presented in Online Appendix 10. Though 
some research indicates differences in immigration attitudes which are dependent on immigrant origin, Ford’s 
(2011) analysis suggests that cohort effects do not vary much across immigrant origin: on average, there are 
cohort differences in immigration attitudes regardless of the country of origin mentioned in the survey question 
(apart from when Australians are mentioned as the immigrant group). Our measure should, therefore, adequately 
capture this overall effect. 
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Measuring Cohorts 
As is standard in APC analysis (Mason and Fienberg 1985: 3), cohorts are grouped into 5-year 
intervals based on birth year: those born between 1920-1924, those born between 1925-1929, 
and so on, with the youngest cohort being those born in 1995 or later.10 This produced 15 birth-
year cohorts. In order to assess the contextual socialisation effect during a cohort’s formative 
years, we add 15 years to each birth group to create ‘socialisation cohorts’, which share the 
same historical upbringing. This implies that the 1920-24 cohort was in effect socialised in 
1935-39, when this cohort was around 15 years old. We define adolescence as the most 
formative years according to Bartels and Jackman (2014), who used a Bayesian learning model 
to estimate the formative years (see the Robustness section for alternative socialisation 
configurations).  
Individual-Level Control Variables 
In order to isolate the impact of cohort effects, it is important to account for individual-level 
alternative explanations as well as disentangle the socialisation effect from other potential 
societal changes over time, which affect the composition of cohorts. Most importantly, our 
models include individual-level age, which is converted from the respondent’s birth year. We 
only include respondents aged 20 and older in order to not confound the current with our 
assumed socialization period (15-20 years old). We also control for individual level education. 
Like age, education has been shown to have fairly consistent, powerful effects on attitudes to 
immigration and related outlooks such as prejudice (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), and it is possible that any cohort differences in immigration 
attitudes are largely a result of differences in levels of education between cohorts (Wilkes and 
 
10 We opted for 5-year birth cohorts to ensure that we have enough observations per cohort per ESS wave. See the 
Robustness section for tests on alternative cohort configurations.  
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Corrigall-Brown 2011). Education is measured on a 5-point scale indicating the respondent’s 
reported highest education completed, ranging from less than lower secondary education (1) to 
tertiary education completed (5) and has been converted into dummy variables for our analyses. 
Other individual-level control variables include gender, whether the individual is unemployed, 
and whether they find it difficult to live on their present income, where 1 represents financial 
struggles and 4 living comfortably (see Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016; Quillian 1995).11 
Measuring Socialisation and Contemporary Immigration-Related Diversity  
In order to test our hypotheses, we need to measure the immigration-related diversity context 
to which each cohort was exposed during their formative years, while controlling for current 
levels of immigration, which will affect all cohorts similarly (period effect). Level of diversity 
in our analysis is measured by the percentage of foreign-born individuals in the country. 
Contemporary data are available annually from the OECD and so we are able to investigate the 
potential impact of current levels of diversity (period effects) using the percent foreign-born in 
the year of the survey. Though recent cross-national research highlights the potential 
importance of the share of the population that is of non-European origin (Gorodzeisky and 
Semyonov 2016, 2018), in the case of the UK, both European and non-European migration are 
likely to be important, given the dramatic increase in numbers of migrants from other European 
countries over the timespan of the ESS. We therefore use percent foreign born in the UK in the 
year of the survey to capture overall level of diversity.12  
 
11 We refrained from using actual income, as the variable has about 25% missing values. Nevertheless, objective 
and subjective income are strongly correlated (Pearson’s r=0.42). 
12 In the Robustness section below, we investigate ethnic diversity as an alternative measure for contemporaneous 
diversity-related threat (period effect). 
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To test H2 and H3, likely exposure to more or less immigration-related diversity is also 
captured as a cohort effect. Measuring the level of diversity during the respondents’ formative 
years presents challenges regarding how to measure indeterminate periods spanning multiple 
ages of individuals. An additional challenge is that indicators of level of diversity were 
available with less regularity than contemporary indicators of percent foreign-born. However, 
Migration Watch (2014) has produced a report based on historic census data that provides the 
percent foreign born as reported in each census between 1851-2011. Apart from the World War 
II period, censuses were generally conducted every ten years, beginning in 1851. Assuming 
that immigration numbers, as captured by the percent foreign-born, are generally very slow 
changing, we use linear interpolation to estimate the percent foreign-born for the cohorts in 
between those for whom census results can be used.   
Cohorts are grouped into 5-year socialisation cohorts and we calculate the average 
context during each cohort’s formative years using the above-mentioned historic census results. 
In our analysis, for example, for the 1940-44 birth cohort, level of diversity is 5.0 per cent 
foreign born, as estimated by the 1961 census, when this generation was about 15-20 years old. 
For the 1950-54 cohort, that figure is 6.4, from the 1971 census, with the cohort between these 
two (1945-49) being assigned a value of 5.7, and so on. Because cohort-level diversity 
increases linearly and therefore potentially creates identification problems (see below), we also 
investigate five-year change in diversity during the impressionable years, using the same data. 
This variable is also theoretically relevant, as some research on the impact of macro-level 
diversity conditions indicates that changes in diversity may be more relevant than levels, at 
least contemporaneously (Hopkins 2010). As is shown in Figure A1 in the Online Appendix, 
5-year change was quite low at around +0.4 per cent from 1925-1960. In the 1960s there was 
a change of approximately +0.6 per cent per 5-year interval and then change in immigration 
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nearly stalled in the 1970s, before substantially increasing to approximately +2 per cent per 5-
year interval from the late 1990s onwards. 
Macro-Level Economic Variables 
Beyond investigating the impact of immigration, we include three macro-economic factors. 
Research on immigration attitudes has focused especially on unemployment and GDP per 
capita (e.g., Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Golder 2003; Meuleman et al. 2019; Quillian 
1995); we, therefore, incorporate these. We also investigate the potential effect of income 
inequality, a factor largely overlooked in existing studies of cross-time changes in attitudes and 
behaviours despite being argued to be crucial in producing a competitive macro-environment 
in which distrust and intolerance thrive (Uslaner 2002).  All three variables are included both 
as contemporary controls (measured at the time of the survey), as well as potential cohort 
effects, whereby we use the same method as above. We match to each respondent economic 
indicators, averaged over the 5-year interval corresponding to a cohort’s formative years when 
they were around 15 years old. The annual unemployment rate is drawn from the British Office 
of National Statistics (ONS 2016) data back to 1965, and before that we rely on data reported 
in Mitchell (1988); per capita GDP growth is based on data from the Maddison-Project (2001). 
To measure income inequality in the formative years, we use the Gini coefficient, available 
from UNU-WIDER (2017).13  
Empirical Analyses 
This paper investigates whether cohort differences in immigration attitudes exist (H1) and what 
could explain these (H2+H3). Our expectation is that the changing nature of immigration 
 
13 Online Appendix 1 plots the over-time development for the key macro variables: foreign-born population (both 
levels and 5-year change), GDP growth, unemployment, and income inequality.  
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conditions to which each subsequent cohort was exposed during their formative years will leave 
an enduring mark on the immigration attitudes of that generation. In order to test our 
hypotheses, we need to isolate the effect of a respondent belonging to a specific cohort (𝐶!) 
from aging (𝐴!") and being interviewed in a specific year (𝑃"). The problem in identifying the 
unique APC effects on the outcome variable is the so-called ‘APC Conundrum’ (Glenn 2005: 
20), as:  
Ci = Pt - Ait                                                                    [1] 
Once we know someone’s age and the current year (both measured in years), we know 
when they were born. Estimating unique parameters in regression models is thus impossible. 
To deal with this problem, some studies (e.g., Ford 2011) omit one or two of the three variables 
that create the identification problem (age, period or cohort). In the case of anti-immigration 
attitudes, it is likely that all three variables could be relevant. As there is no perfect solution to 
the APC identification problem, we triangulate our results, drawing on two modelling 
approaches to investigate these: generalised additive models (GAMs) and hierarchical age‒
period‒cohort (HAPC) models.14  
Exploring the Cohort Effect: Generalised Additive Models (GAM) 
The Model. Following the work of Neundorf (2010) and Grasso (2014), generalised additive 
models (GAMs) are applied here to account for potential nonlinearity between birth cohorts 
and immigration attitudes. GAMs allow the modelling of unique effects for each cohort, 
permitting the main independent variable to be estimated non-parametrically. The advantage 
of this method over normal descriptive graphs (such as those shown in Online Appendix 2) is 
 
14 Online Appendix 2 additionally plots the average immigration attitudes by birth cohorts and foreign-born 
population descriptively.  
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the inclusion of control variables, most importantly age and period effects. These are added in 
a linear, parametric way, as in multivariate ordinary-least-squares regression (see Beck and 
Jackman 1998) before using graphs to investigate the potential non-linear effects of key 
variables, controlling for other relevant factors. Further information about GAMs, including 
our models, is provided in Online Appendix 3. 
GAM Results. We estimate four separate GAMs. In each model, we include all 
individual-level control variables and depending which of the APC effects is estimated non-
parametrically, the remaining two are controlled for as fixed parameters; one variable is then 
included as a smooth function. For example, in Figure 2a, we control for age categories and 
period dummies, while estimating the smooth function of the cohort effect using the birth year 
as a continuous-level variable (testing H1). In Figure 2b, we substitute the birth year of our 
respondents to use the level of foreign-born population during their formative years as a proxy 
and explanation for the cohort effect (H2). This approach is another APC identification 
strategy, as we use a substantive factor (immigration during one’s formative years) to proxy 
one of the APC effects, in our case the cohort effect (Rodgers 1982).  
Figure 2a illustrates the generational differences in immigration attitudes, controlling for 
age, survey year, education, gender, and individual economic circumstances. Even under this 
fairly conservative test, cohort is relevant in explaining differences in attitudes to immigration. 
Cohorts born between 1940 and 1960 appear to be most negative and cohorts born after 1980 
most positive about immigration. The large confidence intervals for cohorts born before 1930 
show the sparsity of the data, as we do not have many respondents in these birth groups.  Figure 
2b illustrates the potential impact of the level of diversity in the cohort’s formative years: taking 
into account individual-level factors (including age and education) and period effects, greater 
diversity in a cohort’s formative years is related to more positive attitudes to immigration for 
that cohort. Figures 2a and 2b provide empirical evidence that cohorts are indeed relevant to 
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explaining variation in attitudes to immigration and cohort differences may be due to increased 
early-years diversity.  
 
Figure 2: Smooth functions based on GAM (incl. 95% c.i.) 
 
Note: The figure shows the estimated smooth functions based on four separate GAMs. All 
models include control variable and coefficients are reported in Online Appendix 4. 
 
 Figures 2c and 2d illustrate age and period effects, controlling for other individual-level 
variables and cohort and/or period effects as appropriate; these indicate that life-cycle (age) 
effects are also relevant to attitudes to immigration, though less pronounced once we control 
for cohort effects. Figure 2d reveals clear period effects: attitudes to immigration in the UK 
generally became relatively more negative in 2008 and a great deal more positive in 2016.15  
 
15 Though it is difficult to determine precisely what has produced these period effects (i.e., beyond those for which 
we already control, including economic conditions), 2008 coincided with the setting in of the ‘Great Recession’; 
Round 8 of the ESS coincided with the UK’s Brexit referendum and reveals some potential backlash against 
anti-immigration sentiment following the referendum (also reported in subsequent polls; see 
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Explaining Cohort Differences: Hierarchical Age, Period, Cohort models (HAPC)  
The Model. We further investigate cohort differences in attitudes to immigration, as well as the 
interaction predicted by H3, using hierarchical age‒period‒cohort (HAPC) models. Yang 
(2006) suggests using mixed (fixed and random effects) models, allowing random intercepts to 
account for cross-classified grouping of cohorts and periods (survey years). The advantage of 
the HAPC model is that it estimates cohort and period effects as random effects, which does 
not impose linearity, thus solving the APC identification problem. A second advantage is the 
ability to test why cohorts (or periods) are different from one another. The rationale and detailed 
description (including critiques such as limited degrees of freedom at higher levels) of HAPC 
models is provided in Online Appendix 5. 
Results. Our HAPC modelling begins by including the age fixed effect and cohort and period 
random effects in an otherwise null model (see Table 1, M0). As shown in this model, all three 
of these components—age, cohort and period—are independently relevant to understanding 
immigration attitudes in the UK. Model 1 adds individual-level control variables, including 
education, which is likely to be pertinent in understanding cohort differences in attitudes to 
immigration. As expected, respondents with higher education are more positive about 
immigration.16 In fact, when these individual-level control variables are included in the model 
(M1), the variance component for cohort increases. This is a product of more accurate estimates 
of cohort effects once we account for societal changes, in particular, education, over the last 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/02/britons-more-sold-on-immigration-benefits-than-other-
europeans). 
16 Coefficients for all control variables based on M4 are reported in Online Appendix 6. 
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few decades. The goal of the remaining analyses is to try to explain this residual variance—
i.e., to account for this variance using measures of the socialisation context.17 
 
Table 1: Linear HAPC Model Predicting Positive Immigration Attitudes 
 M0 (b/se) M1 (b/se) M2 (b/se) M3 (b/se) M4 (b/se) M5 (b/se) 
Age (20+) -0.011***  -0.007***  0.014***  0.015***  0.014***  0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Individual-level controls  yes yes yes yes yes 
Socialisation context       
Level of foreign-born pop.   0.201***  0.207***  0.203***   
   (0.037) (0.043) (0.044)  
5-year change in foreign-born pop.      0.381***  
      (0.102) 
Economic controls    yes yes yes 
Current context       
Level of foreign-born pop.     0.128*  0.164**  
     (0.069) (0.067) 
Economic controls     yes yes 
Intercept 5.118***  3.195***  0.815*  0.383 -5.447 -3.796 
 (0.139) (0.184) (0.448) (0.560) (4.271) (4.208) 
Variance Components       
Cohort (1935-2015) 0.088***  0.183***  0.073***  0.058***  0.058***  0.084***  
 (0.030) (0.049) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.046) 
Period (2002-2017) 0.322***  0.290***  0.261***  0.260***  0.169***  0.167***  
 (0.083) (0.075) (0.068) (0.068) (0.046) (0.046) 
N  13,081 13,081 13,081 13,081 13,081 13,081 
AIC  57,575 56,092 56,074 56,075 56,077 56,081 
Significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** P<0.01. Data ESS, round1-8.  
Note: Entries are regression coefficients and their standard errors of a HAPC model. The dependent variable is an 
index on immigration attitudes where 0=‘negative’ and 10=‘positive’. Individual-level controls: gender, education, 
unemployment, subjective income. Economic controls: GDP growth, unemployment, income inequality.   
 
Model 2 adds the proportion of the foreign-born population during the cohort’s 
formative years. As was the case with the GAM results, these results indicate that level of 
diversity in the formative years is significantly related to contemporary attitudes to 
 
17 Online Appendix 6 plots the random effects for the cohort and period estimates.  
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immigration, even controlling for individual-level age, education, and the other factors shown 
in Table 1. The variance for the cohort component also reduces by approximately 60 per cent. 
Model 3 adds the economic circumstances cohorts faced during their formative years, which 
further reduces the variance in cohort variation slightly. Even with these macro-economic 
controls in the model, higher levels of diversity in the formative years continues to be related 
to attitudes to immigration in the expected direction according to H2b. 
Controlling for individual-level and macro-level factors, if a generation is exposed to 1 
per cent higher levels of foreign-born population, immigration attitudes are 0.2 points higher 
(i.e., more positive) on a 0-10 point scale. This is equivalent to a 1/10 standard deviation change 
in the dependent variable (s.d.=2.21). To put this into perspective, let us take an example. 
Generations that grew-up in the 1930s were exposed to only a 3 per cent level of diversity. In 
the early 2000s, this proportion increased to about 10 per cent. This 7 per cent increase in 
exposure to diversity is comparable to getting a university degree rather than only having only 
primary education (b=1.527; p<0.001).   
 Model 4 controls for potential period effects and indicates that contemporary levels of 
diversity are only weakly associated with more positive immigration attitudes (b=0.128; 
p<0.1). Moreover, the results of M4 suggest that the levels of immigration during one’s 
formative years are more strongly related to immigration attitudes than current levels of 
foreign-born population. This confirms the arguments and findings of political socialisation 
literature, which stresses the importance of early socialisation experiences.  
Some might argue that the relatively linear increase of the level of the foreign-born 
population could cause an identification issue for the estimation of the age, cohort and period 
effects. To mitigate this issue, we use the 5-year change in the foreign-born population during 
a cohort’s formative years in Model 5. The effect of a 1 per cent (positive) change in 
immigration leads to a 0.381 increase in pro-immigration attitudes in later life. 
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Based on Table 1, we can confirm that there is evidence to support Hypothesis 2b, 
which stated that increased diversity during a respondent’s formative years is associated with 
more positive attitudes to immigration. However, H3 stipulates that it is possible that the impact 
of diversity is dependent on whether respondents also faced a threatening economic 
environment (Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Quillian 1995). We have investigated this 
possibility using our economic indicators, and of these, only income inequality – a previously 
neglected variable – appeared to moderate the effect of diversity in the early years.  
 
Figure 3: Marginal Effects of the Socialisation Context of Foreign-Born Population (at c) 
Conditional of Economic Context During the Formative Years 
 
Note: The results are based on M4 in Table 1 and include additional interaction effects (one by one). 
The coefficients are reported in Online Appendix 7.  
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Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of diversity during one’s formative years conditional 
on unemployment, GDP growth and income inequality.18 As the results confirm, the general 
health of the economy does not seem to impact the relationship between immigration levels 
and attitudes. However, the potential impact of an influx of foreign-born people into the UK is 
weakly conditional on the level of income inequality: the positive impact of diversity observed 
in Table 1 appears to vanish as inequality increases. The findings illustrated in Figure 3 
generally suggest that immigration and income inequality interact and could offset each other. 
 
Robustness Tests. To investigate the robustness of our findings that higher diversity during 
one’s youth has a long-term positive impact on immigration attitudes, we estimated several 
additional models. Results are reported in Online Appendices 8-12.  
 (1) We make sure the results are not being driven by the specifics of our sample (see 
Online Appendix 8). We do this by re-running the models, a) dropping the current younger 
generations (born after 1995) who we have not yet had the chance to follow for a lengthy period 
of time; b) dropping the first cohort, which was socialised from 1935-1939; c) changing the 
sample to only include respondents above the age of 20 to not conflate a respondent’s 
socialisation and period contexts. The results remain robust.  
 (2) Next, we utilise the richer available data for contemporary immigration by 
calculating change in immigration, compared to 5 and 10 years prior the survey year (period 
effect). The potential impact of contemporary change is sensitive to the specification of the 
length of change, but we do not find a significant effect of net migration. Lastly, we substituted 
 
18 The coefficients for these models are reported in Online Appendix 7.  
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ethnic diversity for the percent foreign born (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016; Kaufman 
2014), which confirm our original results.  
 (3) We re-estimated M4 (Table 1) for each of the three variables measuring attitudes 
towards immigration separately, instead of using an index. The results presented in Online 
Appendix 10 confirm that diversity during a cohort’s formative years has the same relationship 
to all three items.  
(4) We explore whether there is a general cultural shift to more tolerant values that is 
linked to other outcome variables beyond attitudes towards immigration. To achieve this, we 
use a placebo test that re-estimates the main model (M4) using support for gay rights as the 
outcome variable. As we report in Online Appendix 10, diversity levels during a cohort’s 
formative years do not affect these attitudes. This supports the interpretation of our results that 
increased immigration-driven diversity is linked to more positive attitudes to immigration, but 
not necessarily to other cultural values. 
(5) We explore the impact of how we have specified the cohort and age variables, 
crucial parts of the HAPC model (Online Appendix 11). The cohort variable is included in the 
models as a random effect to capture how cohorts vary in their immigration attitudes. In this 
fifth set of robustness tests, we change the cohort variable to reduce the number of birth years 
to 2-years and set the formative years to correspond to the ages 16 and 17. Generally the HAPC 
model based on these 38 2-year birth cohorts remain unchanged vis-à-vis the main results. 
Regarding the age variable, we have also estimated M4 (a) omitting age, (b) testing for 
curvilinearity of age, and (c) using a categorised version of age. These results (Online 
Appendix 12) further confirm the robustness of the relationship between diversity during 
socialisation years and current attitudes to immigration. 
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(6) Lastly, we change the definition of the formative years to (a) 10-15 years old; (b) 
20-25 years old; and (c) 30-35 years old. Here we restrict the sample to only ages that are higher 
than the imposed socialisation age. As Table A11 clearly shows the socialisation effect 
vanishes with older ages, which confirms previous research that has stressed the importance of 
late adolescence as the key formative years.  
Further Reflection on Macro-Level Diversity and Positive Attitudes to Immigration 
Our findings point to the possibility that being socialised in a context in which diversity is 
relatively high ultimately produces more positive attitudes to immigration. Though it is difficult 
to determine precisely why socialisation in a context of high diversity might play such a 
positive role, this may partly be a result of changing norms surrounding immigrant-origin 
diversity, with very different norms prevailing during early-years socialisation of generations 
born in more recent decades. Our control for individual-level education should capture some 
of this change at the individual level, but levels of diversity appear to continue to play an 
independent role even taking education into consideration.  
The impact of early-years diversity may also be a result of increased contact with 
immigrant-origin minorities. This relationship cannot be systematically investigated due to 
lack of cross-time indicators of contact, but Round 7 of the ESS did include questions about 
contact. Based on our hypotheses and findings above, we would expect younger generations 
that were exposed to higher diversity during their formative years to also have more contact 
with immigrants. The most relevant type of contact is likely to be friendships (e.g., Hewstone 
and Swart 2011; Pettigrew et al. 2011). 
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Figure 4. Frequency and Closeness of Contact with Immigrant-Origin Minorities 
 
Source: ESS, Round 7 (2014); non-citizens and immigrant-origin minorities omitted; N=1,634.  
Data is weighted by population and design weight. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.A, stark generational differences exist when it comes to 
having friends from immigrant-origin minority groups: more than 60 per cent of those born 
before 1940 report having no friends from these groups, whereas approximately 70 per cent or 
more of those born since 1985 do report have friends from these groups.19 Even for those born 
between 1975-1985, at least 60 per cent have at least some friends from immigrant-origin 
minority groups. A similar pattern in generational differences emergences for average weekly 
contact with minorities (Figure 4.B). Thus, some of the positive impact of macro-level diversity 
 
19 Respondents were asked ‘Do you have any close friends who are of a different race or ethnic group from most 
British people? 1- yes, several; 2 - yes, a few; 3 - no, none at all’. In Figure 3.A we plot the percentages of those 
that answered 3. 
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may be a result of higher levels of contact with immigrant-origin minorities on the part of 
younger (non-minority) cohorts.20  
Conclusion 
This paper addressed a crucial puzzle and lacuna in the literature regarding the presence or 
absence of systematic generational differences in immigration attitudes. The evidence 
presented here indicates that ceteris paribus, attitudes to immigration are indeed systematically 
different among older generations. Consequently, our findings imply that public perceptions of 
immigration and immigrant-origin minorities in the UK may be undergoing a gradual but 
drastic change as older generations who are less positive about immigration are replaced by 
cohorts who see immigration in a different light. This paper investigated the proposition that 
this generational difference is largely a result of different socialisation experiences: large-scale 
post-war migration to the UK began after the crucial formative years of older cohorts who did 
not have the opportunity to formulate their attitudes to immigration at a time when the UK was 
already a country of immigrant-origin minorities.  
Very few studies of attitudes to immigration in Europe have investigated the impact of 
the socialisation environment due to the shortage of cross-time data necessary to follow cohorts 
over many years and to match these with diversity indicators. This paper, therefore, makes an 
important contribution to the study of attitudes to immigration, finding that in contrast to 
conflict theories of prejudice which might predict that rising numbers of immigrants or 
minorities would produce increased hostility to these groups, rising numbers may actually 
 
20 We have explored using macro-level proxies for the level of contact with immigrant-origin minorities during 
respondents’ impressionable years, such as civil society participation at the individual level, and report these 
results in Online Appendix 13.  
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create the conditions in which increasingly positive perceptions of these groups may thrive (see 
also, Stein et al. 2000).  
Our findings are contrary to earlier work of Coenders and Scheepers (1998) from the 
Netherlands for the 1979-1993 period, which finds that increasing numbers appear to produce 
a slight increase ethnic threat. We are thus not contending that our findings are necessarily 
universal, and it is entirely possible that other contextual factors are important in understanding 
how increased diversity affects public attitudes to that diversity. Indeed, our results also 
indicate that the level of economic inequality at the time of increased diversity may moderate 
diversity’s impact. This finding is especially pertinent considering the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the economic consequences of which are expected to last for decades. If increased inequality 
is not avoided, this may contribute to a long-term decline in the tolerance of the citizenry as 
current economic conditions continue to impact today’s youth for the rest of their lives.  
Our results will, of course, need to be revisited as the UK’s own context changes and 
further survey data become available. The extent to which the effects found here are similar in 
other European countries facing similar cultural divides over immigration should also be 
explored in future research. Understanding the impact of immigration on cohorts in different 
local contexts is also likely to be a fruitful area of research, particularly as more data and 
techniques for analysing local-level opinion develop. Our findings regarding generational 
differences are likely to have implications for broader social cohesion issues, another topic 
which appears to warrant further exploration by social capital researchers. 
It is important to acknowledge that the techniques used here do not definitively establish 
causal links, which would require lengthy panel data following cohorts from their early years 
to the present. In the absence of such data, this paper has used state-of-the-art techniques to 
leverage such an analysis from repeated cross-sectional data and conducted multiple robustness 
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tests in order to verify that the connection we find between early-years diversity and 
contemporaneous attitudes to immigration remains. 
 The UK’s 2016 Brexit referendum and departure from the EU has made our findings 
all the more pressing. Immigration was a key motivating factor behind the ‘Leave’ vote (Clarke 
et al. 2017), but our findings indicate that generational replacement of older, less tolerant 
generations with younger, more tolerant ones (on average) may mean that a crucial impetus 
behind Brexit—concern about immigration—will weaken significantly over time (though ever-
rising income inequality may thwart this trend). This inference from our research further helps 
to understand the strong age divide in the Brexit vote – with the older voters supporting leave, 
while the young predominantly voted to remain in the EU.21 More generally, our findings 
indicate that immigration need not inevitably lead to intergroup conflict and that being 
socialised in a context of high diversity may – in the right conditions – ultimately ameliorate 
rather than produce anti-immigration hostility.  
 
  
 
21 According to a YouGov poll, 71% of 18-24 voted ‘remain’, while 64% of the over-65-year-olds voted ‘leave’ 
(https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted).  
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